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Engagements of the 1st Infantry Battalion

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After the Battle of Iuka, Maj. Gen. Sterling Price’s Confederate Army of the West marched from Baldwyn to Ripley where it joined Maj. Gen. Earl Van Dorn’s Army of West Tennessee. Van Dorn was senior officer and took command of the combined force numbering about 22,000 men. The Rebels marched to Pocahontas on October 1, and then moved southeast toward Corinth. They hoped to seize Corinth and then sweep into Middle Tennessee. Since the Siege of Corinth, in the spring, Union forces had erected various fortifications, an inner and intermediate line, to protect Corinth, an important transportation center. With the Confederate approach, the Federals, numbering about 23,000, occupied the outer line of fortifications and placed men in front of them. Van Dorn arrived within three miles of Corinth at 10:00 am on October 3, and moved into some fieldworks that the Confederates had erected for the siege of Corinth. The fighting began, and the Confederates steadily pushed the Yankees rearward. A gap occurred between two Union brigades which the Confederates exploited around 1:00 pm. The Union troops moved back in a futile effort to close the gap. Price then attacked and drove the Federals back further to their inner line. By evening, Van Dorn was sure that he could finish the Federals off during the next day. This confidence--combined with the heat, fatigue, and water shortages--persuaded him to cancel any further operations that day. Rosecrans regrouped his men in the fortifications to be ready for the attack to come the next morning. Van Dorn had planned to attack at daybreak, but Brig. Gen. Louis Hébert’s sickness postponed it till 9:00 am. As the Confederates moved forward, Union artillery swept the field causing heavy casualties, but the Rebels continued on. They stormed Battery Powell and closed on Battery Robinett, where desperate hand-to-hand fighting ensued. A few Rebels fought their way into Corinth, but the Federals quickly drove them out. The Federals continued on, recapturing Battery Powell, and forcing Van Dorn into a general retreat. Rosecrans postponed any pursuit until the next day. As a result, Van Dorn was defeated, but not destroyed or captured, at Hatchie Bridge, Tennessee, on October 5.

The Battle of Champion Hill , 1862

 Following the Union occupation of Jackson, Mississippi, both Confederate and Federal forces made plans for future operations. Gen. Joseph E. Johnston retreated, with most of his army, up the Canton Road, but he ordered Lt. Gen. John C. Pemberton, commanding about 23,000 men, to leave Edwards Station and attack the Federals at Clinton. Pemberton and his generals felt that Johnston’s plan was dangerous and decided instead to attack the Union supply trains moving from Grand Gulf to Raymond. On May 16, though, Pemberton received another order from Johnston repeating his former directions. Pemberton had already started after the supply trains and was on the Raymond-Edwards Road with his rear at the crossroads one-third mile south of the crest of Champion Hill. Thus, when he ordered a countermarch, his rear, including his many supply wagons, became the advance of his force. On May 16, 1863, about 7:00 am, the Union forces engaged the Confederates and the Battle of Champion Hill began. Pemberton’s force drew up into a defensive line along a crest of a ridge overlooking Jackson Creek. Pemberton was unaware that one Union column was moving along the Jackson Road against his unprotected left flank. For protection, Pemberton posted Brig. Gen. Stephen D. Lee's men atop Champion Hill where they could watch for the reported Union column moving to the crossroads. Lee spotted the Union troops and they soon saw him. If this force was not stopped, it would cut the Rebels off from their Vicksburg base. Pemberton received warning of the Union movement and sent troops to his left flank. Union forces at the Champion House moved into action and emplaced artillery to begin firing. When Grant arrived at Champion Hill, around 10:00 am, he ordered the attack to begin. By 11:30 am, Union forces had reached the Confederate main line and about 1:00 pm, they took the crest while the Rebels retired in disorder. The Federals swept forward, capturing the crossroads and closing the Jackson Road escape route. One of Pemberton's divisions (Bowen’s) then counterattacked, pushing the Federals back beyond the Champion Hill crest before their surge came to a halt. Grant then counterattacked, committing forces that had just arrived from Clinton by way of Bolton. Pemberton’s men could not stand up to this assault, so he ordered his men from the field to the one escape route still open: the Raymond Road crossing of Bakers Creek. Brig. Gen. Lloyd Tilghman’s brigade formed the rearguard, and they held at all costs, including the loss of Tilghman. In the late afternoon, Union troops seized the Bakers Creek Bridge, and by midnight, they occupied Edwards. The Confederates were in full retreat towards Vicksburg. If the Union forces caught these Rebels, they would destroy them.
 

Abraham Lincoln considered Vicksburg, Mississippi, the key to the Civil War. Lincoln knew the importance of securing the Mississippi River, since it was the lifeline of commerce and supplies to the North. Until the Union Army controlled the Mississippi River, effectively splitting the South in two and severing a vital supply line, they'd never be able to proceed with their goal of toppling Richmond. And Vicksburg was the key strategic pin in seizing control of the Mississippi.   In the spring of 1863, the North kicked off the Vicksburg Campaign, with Maj. Gen. Ulysses S. Grant and the Union Army of the Tennessee marching towards the pivotal Warren County objective. The Battle of Grand Gulf, fought on April 29, was one of the campaign's initial struggles.

Union Read Adm. David D. Porter commanded seven ironclad ships in an assault of the fortifications and artillery batteries around Grand Gulf, Mississippi. The plan called for Porter's group to destroy the guns and allow Gen. John A. McClernand's XIII Army Corps, which were being carried on accompanying transports and barges, to occupy the area. Porter's ships succeeded in dispatching the lower guns around Fort Wade, but Fort Coburn, positioned higher, remained out of reach and continued to hammer the Union ironclads.   Unable to defeat the Rebel artillery, Porter regrouped and attacked again, this time merely providing cover for the transports and barges to continue down river. Grant had marched his troops overland below the Gulf and met up with the river party at Bruinsburg. While the Confederacy won the Battle of Grand Gulf, it merely forced a slight change of plans for Grant's men, and the Union Army continued unimpeded towards their ultimate goal of Vicksburg.

In cooperation with Maj. Gen. Ulysses S. Grant’s offensive against Vicksburg, Union Maj. Gen. Nathaniel P. Banks’s army moved against the Confederate stronghold at Port Hudson on the Mississippi River. On May 27, after their frontal assaults were repulsed, the Federals settled into a siege which lasted for 48 days. Banks renewed his assaults on June 14 but the defenders successfully repelled them. On July 9, 1863, after hearing of the fall of Vicksburg, the Confederate garrison of Port Hudson surrendered, opening the Mississippi River to Union navigation from its source to New Orleans.

It was at his engagement that the famous  30 lb federal Parrot gun “Whistling Dick” and the Confederate  10-inch Columbiad “Old Demoralizer” were employed.

The engagement at Raymond led Grant to change the direction of his army's march and move on Jackson, the state capital. It was Grant's intention to destroy Jackson as a rail and communications center and scatter any Confederate reinforcements which might be on the way to Vicksburg. McPherson's Corps moved north through Raymond to Clinton on May 13, while Major General William T. Sherman pushed northeast through Raymond to Mississippi Springs. To cover the march on Jackson, Major General John A. McClernand's Corps was placed in a defensive posture on a line from Raymond to Clinton.

Late in the afternoon of May 13, as the Federals were poised to strike at Jackson, a train arrived in the capital city carrying Confederate General Joseph E. Johnston. Ordered to Jackson by President Jefferson Davis, Johnston was to salvage the rapidly deteriorating situation in Mississippi. Establishing his headquarters at the Bowman House, General Johnston was appraised of troop strength and the condition of the fortifications around Jackson. He immediately wired authorities in Richmond, "I am too late." Instead of fighting for Jackson, Johnston ordered the city evacuated. Gregg was ordered to fight a delaying action to cover the evacuation.

A heavy rain fell during the night which turned the roads into mud. Advancing slowly through a torrential rain, the corps of Sherman and McPherson converged on Jackson by mid-morning of May 14. Around 9 o'clock, the lead elements of McPherson's corps were

fired upon by Confederate artillery posted on the O. P. Wright farm. Quickly deploying his men into line of battle, the Union corps commander prepared to attack. Suddenly, the rain fell in sheets and threatened to ruin the ammunition of his men by soaking the powder in their cartridge-boxes. The attack was postponed until the rain stopped around 11:00 a.m. The Federals then advanced with bayonets fixed and banners unfurled. Clashing with the Confederates in a bitter hand-to-hand struggle, McPherson's men forced the Southerners back into the fortifications of Jackson.

Sherman's corps meanwhile reached Lynch Creek southwest of Jackson at 11 o'clock and was immediately fired upon by Confederate artillery posted in the open fields north of the stream. Union cannon were hurried into position and in short order drove the Confederates back into the city's defenses. The stream was bank full and Sherman's men crossed on a narrow wooden bridge. Reforming their lines, the Federals advanced at 2:00 p.m. until they were stopped by canister fire. Not wishing to expose his men to the deadly fire, Sherman sent one regiment to the right (east) in search of a weak spot in the defense line. These men reached the works and found them deserted, only a handful of state troops and civilian volunteers were left to man the guns in Sherman's front.

At 2:00 p.m., Gregg was notified that the army's supply train had left Jackson and decided to withdraw his command. The Confederates moved quickly to evacuate the city and were well out the Canton Road to the north when Union troops entered Jackson around 3 o'clock. The "Stars and Stripes" were unfurled atop the capitol by McPherson's men, symbolic of Union victory.

Confederate casualties in the battle of Jackson were not accurately reported, but estimated at 845 killed, wounded, and missing. In addition, 17 artillery pieces were taken by the Federals. Union casualties totaled 300 men of whom 42 were killed, 251 wounded, and 7 missing.

Not wishing to waste combat troops on occupation, Grant ordered Jackson neutralized militarily. The torch was applied to machine shops and factories, telegraph lines were cut, and railroad tracks destroyed. With Jackson neutralized and Johnston's force scattered to the winds, Grant turned his army west with confidence toward his objective--Vicksburg.

Battle of the Wilderness, 1864

. The opening battle of Grant’s sustained offensive against the Confederate Army of Northern Virginia, known as the Overland Campaign, was fought at the Wilderness, May 5-7. On the morning of May 5, 1864, the Union V Corps attacked Ewell’s Corps on the Orange Turnpike, while A.P. Hill’s corps during the afternoon encountered Getty’s Division (VI Corps) and Hancock’s II Corps on the Plank Road. Fighting was fierce but inconclusive as both sides attempted to maneuver in the dense woods. Darkness halted the fighting, and both sides rushed forward reinforcements.  At dawn on May 6, Hancock attacked along the Plank Road, driving Hill’s Corps back in confusion. Longstreet’s Corps arrived in time to prevent the collapse of the Confederate right flank. At noon, a devastating Confederate flank attack in Hamilton’s Thicket sputtered out when Lt. Gen. James Longstreet was wounded by his own men. The IX Corps (Burnside) moved against the Confederate center, but was repulsed. Union generals James S. Wadsworth and Alexander Hays were killed. Confederate generals John M. Jones, Micah Jenkins, and Leroy A. Stafford were killed and Lt Colonel George Hoke Forney of the 1^st Infantry Battalion C.S.A. was mortality wounded. The battle was a tactical draw. Grant, however, did not retreat as had the other Union generals before him. On May 7, the Federals advanced by the left flank toward the crossroads of Spotsylvania Courthouse.

Spotsylvania Court House, 1864

As darkness settled over northern Virginia on the evening of May 6, 1864, the two-day series of military engagements that would become known as the battle of the Wilderness came to a close. The first encounter between the war's most prominent military leaders - Lieutenant General Ulysses S. Grant, commanding all United States armies from a headquarters in the field with the Army of the Potomac, and General Robert E. Lee, commanding the Army of Northern Virginia - had ended. At 6:30 A.M. on May 7 Grant issued a directive to the Army of the Potomac commander, Major General George Gordon Meade. The order, one of the most important of Grant's military career, began, "General: Make all preparations during the day for a night march to take position at Spotsylvania Court-House."
        On the night of May 7-8 the Union Fifth Corps and the Confederate First Corps, moving independently and unknown to each other, led the marches of their respective armies toward Spotsylvania Court House. In the morning the lead elements met on the Spindle farm along the Brock Road, and the fighting lasted throughout the day as more units from each army arrived. Elements of the Federal Sixth Corps joined in the attack around midday, but the Union troops were unable to force their way through, and nightfall found two sets of parallel fieldworks across the Brock Road. What the Federals had thought would be a rapid march into open country had stalled behind these works. The battle of Spotsylvania Court House was under way.
        More units of each army continued to arrive on May 9. The Confederate Third Corps marched along the Shady Grove Church Road (today State Route 608) to the village of Spotsylvania Court House. The Federal Second Corps, commanded by Major General Winfield S. Hancock, moved from Todd's Tavern along the Brock Road, then moved off the road to take position to the right of the Fifth Corps, overlooking the Po River. Late in the afternoon troops from the Second Corps crossed the river and moved east on the Shady Grove Church Road as far as the Block House bridge over the Po before darkness halted them.
        During the night Lee sent one brigade, commanded by Brigadier General William Mahone, to block and one division, led by Major General Henry Heth, to attack the Federal force the following day. On the morning of May 10 the three divisions of the Federal Second Corps south of the Po River were directed to return north of that stream to assault another segment of the Confederate line. Two divisions re-crossed successfully, but the third crossed under Confederate fire.
        Elsewhere that day, the Federal commanders attempted to execute a combined attack all along the lines. A series of piecemeal assaults by elements of the Fifth and Second corps at Laurel Hill proved unsuccessful. A bit farther east a charge by twelve Union regiments against the western face of a great salient in the Confederate line was far more carefully arranged. The British military historian C. F. Atkinson, writing in 1908 in Grant's Campaigns of 1864 and 1865, labeled the charge "one of the classic Infantry attacks of military history". This dramatic action also failed, because of the failure of a supporting assault and because of strong Confederate counterstrokes.
        Grant decided to attack the apex of the Confederate salient with the entire Federal Second Corps on May 12. Two divisions of Major General Ambrose Burnside's Ninth Corps were to attack the east face of the Confederate position simultaneously. The Second Corps moved into position after dark.
        At 4:35 A.M. on May 12 the Federal Second Corps moved forward from its position near the Brown house, advanced across the Landrum farm clearing, and struck the apex of the salient. Continuing forward for about half a mile, the Federals captured approximately 3,000 prisoners from Major General Richard S. Ewell's Second Corps before being driven back to the outside of the works by Confederate reserve forces. Both sides forwarded reinforcements (the Federals added units of Major General Horatio Wright's Sixth Corps to the assault), and the northern face of the salient became the focus of close firing and fighting that lasted for twenty-three hours. In mid-afternoon a division of the Ninth Corps advanced, and a portion of it was struck by an advancing pair of Confederate brigades, James H. Lane's and David A. Weisiger's, in an area approximately three quarters of a mile north of the village of Spotsylvania Court House. The resulting engagement was a wild melee in dark woods, with every soldier trying to fight his way back to his own lines.
        A Federal Second Corps soldier, viewing the churned landscape around the "bloody angle" on the morning of May 13, wrote: "The trench on the Rebel side of the works was filled with their dead piled together in every way with their wounded. The sight was terrible and ghastly." Sometime before 2:00 A.M. on May 13 a large oak tree just behind the west face of the salient crashed to the ground. Its trunk, twenty Inches In diameter, had been severed by musket balls.
        The Confederates successfully withdrew to a newly constructed line along the base of the salient at 3:00 A.M. On the night of May 13, 14 the Federal Fifth and Sixth corps marched around to the Fredericksburg Road and went into position south of that road on the left of the Ninth Corps. On May 15 the Second Corps joined the other three Union corps so that the Federal lines, east of the village, now faced west and ran north and south. Three days later two Union corps returned to the salient and attacked the Confederates' final line but were unsuccessful.
        On May 19 Ewell's Confederate Second Corps made a forced reconnaissance around to the Fredericksburg Road to attempt to locate the right flank of the Union line. There they ran into some newly arrived Federal troops that had formerly manned the forts surrounding Washington, D.C. These heavy artillerymen, most of whom were serving under Brigadier General Robert 0. Tyler, were acting as infantry for the first time. The resulting engagement on the Harris farm exacted a heavy toll on both sides: It cost the Confederates 900 casualties and the Federals slightly more than 1,500.
        The battle of Spotsylvania Court House was over. If Grant's intention had been to defeat or even destroy the Army of Northern Virginia, he was unsuccessful at Spotsylvania. Assuming that Lee's primary objective was to hold the line of the Rapidan River and keep the enemy out of central Virginia, the battles of the Wilderness and Spotsylvania can be considered strategic defeats. However, by delaying Grant for two weeks at Spotsylvania, Lee permitted other Confederate forces to resist Union efforts in the vicinity of Richmond and in the Shenandoah Valley, unmolested by the Army of the Potomac.
        Confederate casualties for the two-week long battle were estimated at 9,000-10,000 (combat strength: 63,000). Federal casualties were reported as slightly less than 18,000 (combat strength: 111,000). Perhaps the most notable death was that of Sixth Corps commander Major General John Sedgwick, killed by a “whitworth” sharpshooter's bullet as he prowled the front lines on May 9. Shortly before, Sedgwick had chided some infantrymen trying to dodge the occasional minie balls whistling past with the comment that the Confederates "couldn't hit an elephant at this distance."
        Both armies departed Spotsylvania on May 20 and 21. Lee rode south, aware that he had to avoid a siege of Richmond or the Confederacy would be doomed. He would next meet Grant at the North Anna River.
        Grant had sent a dispatch on May 11 declaring, "I propose to fight it out on this line if it takes all summer. It would take that long and more

After Grant's army escaped from the trap that Lee had set for it at the Battle of North Anna, it began to move again around the right flank of Lee's army, in a continuation of the maneuvering that had characterized the campaign throughout May 1864. It traveled southeast on the north bank of the Pamunkey River, hoping to find the appropriate place to break through Lee's lines. On May 27, Union cavalry established a bridgehead on the south side of the river, near the Hanovertown Ford. As Grant's infantry crossed, cavalry divisions from both armies fought to a standstill at the Battle of Haw's Shop on May 28

Lee's army was in precarious shape as it lay in entrenchments behind Totopotomoy Creek. Although the cavalry action at Haw's Shop had given Lee valuable intelligence that indicated Grant's avenue of approach, the Confederates were short on supplies, due to the Union disruption of the Virginia Central Railroad. And they were also short on men. Lee requested that General P.G.T. Beauregard sent him reinforcements from his 12,000-man army, sitting relatively idle as they bottled up Benjamin Butler's army at Bermuda Hundred. Beauregard initially refused Lee's request, citing the potential threat from Butler. Lee was determined despite this disappointment, and despite the persistence of his recent dysentery at North Anna. He wrote to President Davis, "If General Grant advances tomorrow I will engage him with my present force." (On May 30, appeals to Confederate President Jefferson Davis caused Beauregard to relent and send 7,000 men, the division of Maj. Gen. Robert Hoke, to join Lee.)

The battle would be fought along Totopotomoy Creek, near the 1862 battlefield of Gaines' Mill, at Hanover, and at Bethesda Church, north of Gaines' Mill and Old Cold Harbor.

On May 29, Grant's army advanced southwest to confront Lee. Since most of his cavalry was occupied elsewhere, he decided to use infantry for a reconnaissance in force. The II Corps of Maj. Gen. Winfield S. Hancock followed the Richmond-Hanovertown Road (also known as Atlee Station Road) to the creek. Finding that Lee was firmly entrenched on the far bank, Hancock's men began digging in. The V Corps, under Maj. Gen. Gouverneur K. Warren, extended the II Corps line to the left, placing Brig. Gen. Charles Griffin's division across the creek onto Shady Grove Road. Maj. Gen. Horatio G. Wright's VI Corps was sent northwest from Hanovertown toward Hanover Court House, led by Brig. Gen. David A. Russell's division. Maj. Gen. Ambrose Burnside's IX Corps was in reserve near Haw's Shop and Maj. Gen. Philip Sheridan's Cavalry Corps was far to the Union left, near Old Church. The Confederate line, from left to right, were the corps of Lt. Gen. A.P. Hill, the independent division of Maj. Gen. John C. Breckinridge, just returned from the Shenandoah Valley, and the corps of Maj. Gen. Richard H. Anderson and Lt. Gen. Jubal A. Early. No action beyond minor skirmishing occurred during the day.

Grant began a general advance on May 30. Wright's corps was to move south against A.P. Hill on the Confederate left, while Hancock attacked across the creek against Breckinridge in the center, and Warren moved west toward Early along Shady Grove Road. Wright's advance became bogged down in the swampy land near Crump's Creek, delaying his VI Corps until late in the day. Hancock's skirmishers captured some of Breckinridge's rifle pits, but made little progress against the main Confederate line. Maj. Gen. George G. Meade (who commanded the Army of the Potomac under the supervision of Grant) ordered Burnside's reserve corps to assist Hancock, but they arrived too late in the day to have an effect on the battle. On the Union left, Warren moved the rest of his V Corps across the creek and deployed on Shady Grove Road. They began probing west along the road, Griffin leading, followed by the divisions of Maj. Gen. Samuel W. Crawford and Brig. Gen. Lysander Cutler.

Lee interpreted these movements as a continuation of Grant's campaign strategy to move around Lee's flank and toward the southeast. He ordered Early's corps, which was entrenched across Warren's path, to attack the V corps with the assistance of Anderson's corps. Early planned to send the division of Maj. Gen. Robert E. Rodes on a flanking march along Old Church Road, turning north at Bethesda Church, and follow paths that his cavalry had precut through the underbrush to smash into Warren's rear areas.

As the V corps moved forward slowly, Warren became concerned about the safety of his left flank. He directed Crawford's division to move south along a farm track to Old Church Road, where they erected simple breastworks. Crawford sent forward the brigade of Colonel Martin D. Hardin, men of the Pennsylvania Reserves whose enlistment was due to expire that same day. Rodes's men marched directly into Hardin's brigade at about noon and routed them. The retreat to behind Beaver Dam Creek was contagious and Crawford's entire division formation collapsed, exposing the V Corps' left flank. Unfortunately for the Confederates, Rodes lost control of his men, who ran beyond their objectives and descended into confusion. Rodes hesitated to continue with Early's plan, which called for him to push north into the rear area of Warren's corps. Much of Early's corps was still in march column. Also, Anderson's corps, which was supposed to support Early, was delayed in arriving. Warren began shifting his corps to face south toward Early and Crawford reformed at the farm lane. Griffin's division moved in to support him and the V Corps artillery, under Col. Charles S. Wainwright, arrived and set up several batteries north of Shady Grove Road, on Crawford's left. Griffin's division dug in on Crawford's right.

Maj. Gen. Stephen Dodson Ramseur, of Early's corps, newly promoted to division command, recklessly charged the Union artillery at 6:30 p.m. The assault was poorly conceived in many dimensions, and Early gave permission only reluctantly. Gordon's division was still deploying and could not support the attack. Rodes's men were too occupied with protecting the Confederate right to assist. Ramseur's brigade under Brig. Gen. Thomas F. Toon was pinned down by Federal fire on its open left flank. Therefore, the only brigade that actually attacked was Pegram's Brigade, commanded by Col. Edward Willis. They advanced heroically through a severe crossfire of rifle and cannon fire and were able to close within 50 yards of the Union position. Willis was mortally wounded and the brigade fell back to its starting point.

Ramseur’s attack was a costly repulse, but the Southern soldiers’ heroism earned the admiration of the Union soldiers who witnessed it. The historian of the 13th Pennsylvania Reserves recorded the event: "The slaughter was so sickening that Major Hartshorne leaped to his feet and called upon his assailants to surrender. Some hundreds did so. Rebels or no rebels, their behavior and bearing during the charge had won the admiration of their captors, who did not hesitate to express it."[4] A surviving Virginian recalled, "Our line melted away as if by magic. Every brigade, staff and field officer was cut down, (mostly killed outright) in an incredibly short time."

Grant ordered a general assault across the line to relieve pressure on Warren, but none of his corps commanders were in positions to comply immediately. However, Warren's men had extricated themselves from their predicament without additional assistance. The repulse of Ramseur's division discouraged Early and he ordered his corps to withdraw a short distance to the west. He blamed Anderson for not arriving in time to assist, but the soldiers blamed Ramseur, who had ordered the charge without sufficient reconnaissance.

While the infantry battled at the creek and the church, the cavalry of the two armies clashed to the east in the Battle of Old Church.

Federal casualties were about 750, versus 1,200 Confederates. Confederate Col. Edward Willis, a popular former member of Stonewall Jackson's staff, was mortally wounded during Ramseur's ill-considered assault. Brig. Gen. George P. Doles was killed by a sharpshooter near Bethesda Church on June 2.

Of more concern to Lee than Early's failed attack was intelligence he received that reinforcements were heading Grant's way. Just as Hoke's division was leaving Bermuda Hundred, the 16,000 men of Maj. Gen. William F. “Baldy” Smith's XVIII Corps were withdrawn from Butler's Army of the James at Grant's request and they were moving down the James River and up the York to the Pamunkey. If Smith moved due west from White House Landing to Cold Harbor, 3 miles southeast of Bethesda Church and Grant's left flank, the extended Federal line would be too far south for the Confederate right to deal with it. Lee sent his cavalry under Maj. Gen. Fitzhugh Lee to secure the crossroads at Cold Harbor.

 

Appomattox Campaign, (March-April 1865)

At the surrender only three officers and 6 enlisted men were present from the Battalion.

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